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CONFLICTS OF LAW IN PRODUCT LIABILITY
SUITS: JOINT MAXIMIZATION OF STATES'
INTERESTS
Modern product liability suits commonly involve manufacturers
that distribute their products nationwide. It is not unusual to find a
product manufactured in one state and sold in another, which causes
injury to a party in a third state. Because product liability laws vary
from state to state, a product liability suit often gives rise to a choice
of law question.1
Choice of law methodology in the United States has evolved
from the traditional "vested rights" rules of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws 2 to the currently used interest analysis. 3 Under interest
analysis, a court deciding which law to apply must first assess which
states' policy will be affected by the outcome of the case. To make
such an assessment, a court must determine the states connected
with the case, and then evaluate the relevant laws of those states and
the policies furthered by those laws. A typical product liability case
involves a diversity of contacts; hence, a court is confronted with a
diversity of interested states, relevant substantive laws, and purposes
attributable to the laws. These factors make it difficult to choose the
single most interested state in product liability cases.
This Note examines the development and current state of solutions to the choice of law problems associated with product liability
actions, and concludes the present approaches are unworkable. In
formulating a new standard, this Note suggests that courts should
develop substantive rules that will further the interests of all concerned states. To demonstrate the viability of this "joint maximization" theory, this Note will conclude by providing examples of such
rules.
1. See, e.g., In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 559 F. Supp. 333 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984).

2.

RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

(1934). For a discussion of the "vested rights"

theory, see infra text accompanying notes 10-34.
3. This Note uses the term "interest analysis" as a generic name for all modern choice
of law approaches.
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A

BRIEF HISTORICAL

OVERVIEW

The first known choice of law theorists were the Italian statutists 4 who differentiated between "real" laws and "personal" laws.
Real laws applied only in the territory governed by the enacting
6
body. 5 Personal laws followed an individual wherever they went.
The statutists also developed a third legal category called "mixed"
laws. 7 When the statutists had to apply their choice of law theory,

however, they could not decide among themselves which laws were
personal, which were real, and which were "mixed." Moreover,
problems were generated by disagreement over how "mixed" laws
should be applied." These problems attending characterization led to

the ultimate demise of the statutists' theory.9
In the United States, courts and scholars developed choice of
law rules that could be applied without regard to the particular content of the conflicting laws. 10 These rules were incorporated in the
first Restatement of Conflict of Laws, by Professor Beale." For ex-

ample, in tort cases, section 378 of the first Restatement states that
the law of the place of the wrong must govern. 1 2 The place of the

wrong is defined as the "state where the last event necessary to make
an actor liable for an alleged tort takes place." ' 3 Courts have defined
14
the site of the "last event" in tort cases to mean the place of injury.
4. These scholars were called statutists because the local laws and customs were known
as "statuta." D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE-oF-LAW PROCESS 2 (1965). The first American conflicts
of law book was written by a statutist, Samuel Livemore. De Nova, The First American Book
on Conflict of Laws, 8 AM. J. LEGAL HIsT. 136, 137 (1964).
In Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMp. L. 297, 300
(1953), the author tells of a choice of law rule discovered "in the wrappings of a crocodile
mummy."
5. D. CAVERS, supra note 4, at 2.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. See id. at 2-3.
10. See, e.g., Alabama Great S.R.R. v. Carrol, 97 Ala. 126, 11 So. 803 (1892).
"[W]hether a cause of action arose and existed at all, or not, must in all reason be determined
by the law which obtained at the time and place when and where the fact which is relied on to
justify a recovery transpired." Id. at 134, 11 So. at 806.
1. Professor Beale was the reporter of the Restatement.
12. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934) provides: "(1) If a cause of
action in tort is created at the place of wrong, a cause of action will be recognized in other
states; (2) If no cause of action is created at the place of wrong, no recovery in tort can be had
in any other state."
13. Id. § 377.
14. See, e.g., Hill v. Clark Equip. Co., 85 Mich. App. 1, 6, 270 N.W.2d 722, 724
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The Restatement also provides rules for the solution of other conflict

of laws situations. Thus, in contract cases, section 332 provides that,

as a general matter, the law of the place of contracting governs.' 5
The Restatement rules were based on the theory that in a choice
of law case, the court's task was to enforce "vested rights."' 16 For
example, in tort cases the rights of the parties vest at the time of

injury. The role of the courts is to enforce the obligation that has
been created at the time of injury.17 Thus, the applicable law of the
place of injury governs the rights of the injured party. 8 Justice
Holmes summarized the theory by stating, "The liabilities of parties

to each other are fixed by the law of the territorial jurisdiction
within which the wrong is done . . . [t]hat and that alone is the
foundation of their rights." '
The Restatement approach was severely criticized for being "jurisdiction selecting." 20 Courts faithful to the Restatement would
(1978). See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 377 Note 1 (1934).
15. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934) provides that "the law of the
place of contracting determines the validity and effect of a promise with respect to: (a) capacity to make the contract; . . . (h) the absolute or conditional character of the promise." Matters concerning the performance of a contract are determined by the law of the place of performance. Id. §§ 355-72.
16. See 3 J. BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 1968 (1935).
17. Id. Under the "vested rights" theory, a court does not apply foreign law when it
finds another jurisdiction's law applicable; rather, it enforces the rights of the parties which
were created at the time of injury. See Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested
Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 663 (1918).
18. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
19. Cuba R.R. v. Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
See also Slater v. Mexican Nat'l R.R., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904) (Holmes, J.)("The theory of
the foreign suit is that . . . the act complained of. . . gave rise to an obligation . . . which,
like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the person may be
found."); Walton v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872
(1952). The court in Walton directed a verdict for defendant when the plaintiff failed to state
in his complaint the pertinent law of the place of injury. The plaintiff argued that the court
should apply forum law. The court held that since the rights of the plaintiff vested at the place
of injury, the law of the place of injury is an essential element of his complaint. The court also
held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district judge to refuse to take judicial notice
of the foreign law. The plaintiff did not state a cause of action when he failed to mention the
applicable law in his complaint. Id. at 542, 544-45, 546. In B. CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 1-76 (1963), Professor Currie used Walton to illustrate the injustice
of the vested rights approach.
20. Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173, 194, 208
& n.59 (1933). The vested rights theory was strongly criticized in Cook, The Logical and
Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924); Lorenzen, Territoriality,Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Yntema, The Hornbook
Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928). Professor Currie wrote that
Cook's criticism "discredited the vested-rights theory as thoroughly as the intellect of one man
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search for a conflict of law rule to decide which jurisdiction's law
applied.21 The content of the law became material only after the
court decided which state's law would govern.2 2 Such a conflicts approach led to grossly unjust results.23
A simple hypothetical will illustrate the inequities which result
from application of the vested rights approach. Passengers domiciled
in state A board a plane in state A to travel to state B. The plane is
registered in state A and is owned by a citizen of state A. While en
route, the plane crashes in state C. The passengers sue the owner of
the plane in the courts of state A for wrongful death. States A and B
have no wrongful death limitation. State C has a $50,000 wrongful
death limitation. Under the vested rights rule the law of the place of
injury applies; hence, the courts would apply a recovery limitation of
$50,000. Such a result is unjust and irrational.2 The parties are
both residents of a state that allows full recovery. The plaintiffs were
traveling from a state that allows full recovery to a state that allows
full recovery. Thus, they can rightfully expect to be permitted full
recovery. The defendant is a resident of state A so he can expect its
law to apply. State C's only connection to this lawsuit is the fortuitous occurrence of the accident within its territory. Such a connection should not be sufficient to disregard the expectations of the
plaintiffs, and the interest of state A, the forum where all parties are
residents.25
Many courts tried to avoid unfair results without rejecting the
vested rights approach by applying a characterization approach.
Under the vested rights approach, the first question a court must ask
in a conflict of laws dispute is how to characterize the facts at bar.26
If the issue is characterized as a tort issue, the law of the place of
injury applies. 27 If it is characterized as a contract issue, the law of
the place of contracting applies. 28 If it is characterized as a procedural issue, forum law applies. 29 Courts would characterize tort iscan ever discredit the intellectual product of another." B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 6.
21. Cavers, supra note 20, at 178.

22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 648-49, 475
A.2d 648, 650 (1984) ("[lIt came to be recognized that the 'mechanical application' of the lex

loci delictl doctrine often produced an unjust result.").
24. See First Nat'l Bank v. Rostek, 182 Colo. 437, 442, 514 P.2d 314, 318 (1973).

25. Id.
26. See R. CRAMTON, D. CURRIE & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 75-78 (3d ed. 1981).
27. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 384 (1934).
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1934). See supra note 13.
29. RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934). See also id. § 584, which pro-
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sues as contract,30 and substantive issues as procedural, 31 to circum-

vent the rigid "place of injury" rule.
Additionally, some courts developed a public policy exception to
the tort "place of injury" rule. 2 If the applicable place of injury law
33
was contrary to the public policy of the forum, forum law applied.
These courts were implicitly rejecting the vested rights approach.
With the passage of time, courts began to reject categorically the
vested rights approach, and today, a majority of jurisdictions have
rejected this approach. 4
MODERN CONFLICT OF LAW APPROACHES: A CRITICAL
EXAMINATION OF THEORIES IN THE PRODUCT LIABILITY CONTEXT

II.

The most prevalent modern conflict of law approaches are Currie's interest analysis,3 5 the Restatement (Second)36 "most significant
relationship" approach, and pro-plaintiff rules. 37 All three ap-

proaches exhibit shortcomings when applied to choice of law questions in product liability suits.
vides that "[t]he court at the forum determines according to its own Conflict of Laws rule
whether a given question is one of substance or procedure."
30. See, e.g., Levy v. Daniels' U-Drive Auto Renting Co., 108 Conn. 333, 143 A. 163
(1928) (vicarious liability issue characterized as contract). See Recent Cases, 42 HARV. L.
REv.433, 434 (1929) ("The purpose of the statute ... was not to regulate contracts, but to
create a new tort liability."); Recent Important Decisions, 27 MICH. L. REv. 462, 463 (1929)
("[T]he court has employed a mere fiction to justify its result, for the statutory liability was
not ...part of the contract."). Even those commentators who defended the court's decision in
Levy wrote that "the result was sound regardless of the method whereby it was reached." G.
STUMBERG. PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 202-03 (3d ed. 1963) (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) (survival of tort
action rule characterized as procedural to apply forum law). In Sumner, Choice of Law GoverningSurvival of Actions, 9 HASTINGS LJ.128 (1958), the author discussed Grant and noted
that the characterization of survival of tort actions as procedural was against the overwhelming weight of authority in the United States. The court in Grant was "greatly influenced by
the 'sympathy' factors in the case." Id. at 137.
32. See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 40, 172 N.E.2d 526, 528, 211
N.Y.S.2d 133, 136 (1961) (refusing to apply the place of injury law in a wrongful death
action, the court stated that the law "is so completely contrary to our public policy that we
should refuse to apply [it].").
33. Id.
34. A 1983 study found that only 16 states still followed the traditional approach. Of
the 16 states, 9 considered and rejected adopting a modern theory. Five states left the matter
open for future consideration. Two states applied the traditional approach without any discussion of other theories. Three other states have rejected the vested rights approach in special
cases. Kay, Theory into Practice:Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L. REv.521, 58283 (1983).
35. See B. CURRIE, supra note 19.
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
37. See infra note 112 and accompanying text.
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Currie's Interest Analysis

Professor Currie asserted that in deciding choice of law cases,
courts should consider the legitimate interests of the states involved

in the choice of law controversy. Currie's theory involves a four-tier
approach.38 First, even when there are foreign elements in a case, if
the court is not asked to apply another jurisdiction's law, it should
apply its own law.3 9 Second, when the court is asked to apply foreign
law, the court should inquire into the policies expressed by the respective conflicting laws. 0 If the court finds that the determination
in this case will affect only one state's policies, that state has the
only legitimate interest in the outcome of the suit, and its law should
apply.4 1 Third, if the court finds that more than one state's policy
will be affected by the outcome of this case, the court should reexamine the policies of the forum with a view toward finding a more
restrained interpretation of forum policy. 42 If upon reconsideration,
38. B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 183-86. There are actually five principles that Currie
asserts which are summarized here without loss of content. Id.
39. Id. at 183-84.
40. Currie suggests that this is done through the ordinary process of "construction or
interpretation." Id. at 183-84. The court should try to decide the case as it believes the legislature would have wanted the case decided had it forseen this particular problem. See id. at 606.
See also Brilmayer, Interest Analysis and the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 MicH. L. REV.
392 (1980) (interest analysis seeks to ascertain the objective that the legislature was trying to
accomplish by the enactment of the statute). In the majority of conflict of law cases, however,
one cannot determine the legislative intent regarding the scope of the state's concern. Sedler,
Interest Analysis as the Preferred Approach to Choice of Law: A Response to Professor
Brilmayer's "FoundationalAttack," 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 483, 486 (1985) ("Legislative intent is
relevant in the choice of law context only when the legislature has manifested its intent as to
the law's applicability to a situation containing a foreign element .

. .

. In most cases, the

legislature will not have manifested such intent one way or another.
...).
41. In conflicts literature this situation is called a false conflict. See, e.g., Baxter, Choice
of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. Rav. 1, 9 (1963).
42. B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 186. Currie does not give any guidelines on how and to
what extent a court should apply a restrained interpretation. See Cavers, Contemporary Conflicts Law In American Perspective, 131 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE 75, 147-48 (1970).
Additionally, there seems to be some inconsistency in Currie's views. Initially, he argues
that the "assessment. . . of the competing legitimate interests of two sovereign states, in order
to determine which is to prevail, is a political function of a very high order. This is a function
that should not be committed to courts in a democrary." B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 182.
Thus, when a court finds that two states have an interest in having its law applied the court
cannot choose one state's interest over another.
Later, however, Currie writes that "there is room for restraint and enlightenment in the
determination of what state policy is and where state interests lie." Id. at 186. A moderate and
restrained interpretation of the relevant laws, however, necessarily entails an assessment of
competing interests. Currie explains this inconsistency by reasoning that according to his approach a moderate and restrained look is permissible only when interpreting state policy, not
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the court decides that only one state's policy will be affected, it
should apply the law of the interested state. Fourth, if the court finds
that a conflict cannot be avoided between the policies of the states
involved in the case, it should apply forum law.43
Currie's analysis is based upon the presumption that courts can
ascertain the policies furthered by particular laws. 44 In theory, Currie's presumption seems workable; in practice, however, this task is
very difficult. 45 Two New York Court of Appeals decisions concerning guest statutes demonstrate the difficulties courts have in ascertaining state policies.
In Dym v. Gordon,48 two New York domiciliaries were involved
in a car accident in Colorado, while temporarily residing in that
state. The plaintiff, a passenger in the car, sued the driver for negligence. Colorado had a guest statute which barred the guest in a car
from recovering against the driver unless there was willful and wanton disregard of safety. Under New York law, the plaintiff only had
to prove ordinary negligence. The plaintiff argued that the purpose
of Colorado's guest statute was to protect local insurance companies
from fraudulent claims. Thus, when the defendant is from New
York and his car is insured by New York insurers, Colorado should
not have an interest in having its law apply. The New York Court of
Appeals applied Colorado law. The court reasoned that Colorado's
guest statute was intended to give injured parties in other cars priority over the "ungrateful guest" in the assets of the negligent driver.
ColoIn a Colorado accident where other local residents are 4injured,
7
apply.
statute
guest
its
having
rado has an interest in
In a later case, Tooker v. Lopez,48 the court admitted that it
when weighing state interests after having interpreted the state policies. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 754, 756-64 (1963). Currie, however, does not
explain how interpreting state policy is different from weighing the state interests. See Cavers,
supra at 148. Professor Cavers criticized Curries distinction, stating that the "'weighing' of
interests after interpretation is condemned: 'weighing' of interests in interpretation, condoned,
not to say encouraged." Id. It is the same approach in a different guise.
43. B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 119. In conflict literature this situation is called a true
conflict. See Baxter, supra note 41, at 9.
44. See B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 183-84.

45. See Rosenberg, Two Views on Kell v. Henderson" An Opinion for the New York
Court of Appeals, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 459, 464 (1967). "Searching for governmental interests
presupposes that the purposes behind substantive rules are so clear, so singular, so unequivocal
that we can hope to discover them with some certainty and some consensus. This is at odds
with reality." Id.
46. 16 N.Y.2d 120, 209 N.E.2d 792, 262 N.Y.S.2d 463 (1965).
47. Id. at 124, 209 N.E.2d at 794, 262 N.Y.S.2d at 466.
48. 24 N.Y.2d 569, 249 N.E.2d 394, 301 N.Y.S.2d 519 (1969).
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had erred in Dym, and that the purpose of guest statutes is only to
protect insurance companies from fraudulent claims. Therefore, the
state has a legitimate interest in applying its guest statute only if the
49
insurer is a local domiciliary.
The experience of the New York Court of Appeals with guest
statutes underscores the uncertainty courts are faced with when they
must determine the policies underlying particular laws. Without a
clear indication of the purpose of relevant rules, the court either
makes an arbitrary choice or bases its choice on the policy ideas of
the forum. Such a practice is hardly consistent with the ground rules
of interest analysis, which are to ascertain the policies underlying the
relevant laws.5 0 Furthermore, some cases appear to have been decided in a conclusory manner, with the court fashioning the interest
analysis to support a predetermined result.51 Professor Currie consid52
ered such an approach unacceptable.

In product liability suits, it is extremely difficult to ascertain
with certainty the policy underlying a particular jurisdiction's product liability law. For example, a law favoring recovery can indicate a

policy either to encourage manufacturers to produce defect-free
products,5" or to comiensate the injured party. 54
If the purpose of a pro-recovery rule is to compensate injured
plaintiffs, the state would only have an interest in protecting its own
49. Id. at 574-75, 249 N.E.2d at 397, 301 N.Y.S.2d at 523-24.
50. See supra note 40.
51. See Infra text accompanying notes 73-83.
52. B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 105 ("I think it is clear that we cannot accept any
conflict of laws method that proceeds on such premises.").
53. See, e.g., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1129 (1st Cir. 1978) (Rhode
Island has an interest "in promoting a high standard of care in the manufacture of goods by
Rhode Island corporations."). In Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129, 1141
(N.D. Tex. 1980), the court reasoned that a state has an interest in promoting a higher standard of care by its local manufacturers because "the economic results of a safe product and a
good reputation are directly and indirectly beneficial to the state." Id.
Upon closer analysis one can argue that applying strict liability per se in all suits against
local manufacturers would damage the state's economic position. Strict liability raises the costs
of manufacturing and, consequently, raises the cost of the product. Ultimately, local manufacturers become less competitive in the marketplace. Additionally, such a rule would deter manufacturers from conducting manufacturing operations in strict liability states. See Deemer v.
Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 651, 475 A.2d 648, 652 (1984).
Nevertheless, a state may have a legitimate interest in promoting a higher standard of
care by local manufacturers because the safer the locally manufactured goods are, the less
chance there is for a local resident to be injured by a defective product.
54. See Deemer v. Silk City Textile Mach. Co., 193 N.J. Super. 643, 651, 475 A.2d
648, 652 (1984) ("[T]he principal aim of a product liability or other personal injury claim is
fairly to compensate the injured party.").
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citizens.5 5 If the purpose of a pro-recovery rule is to penalize manufacturers to ensure that they manufacture safe products, however,
the state's interest is 'not limited to allowing recovery for local
residents."
Similarly, the purpose of a pro-manufacturer rule can be either
to protect manufacturers 57 or to encourage consumers to be more
cautious in buying and using products. 88 If the purpose of the rule is
to protect manufacturers, the state should only be interested in protecting local manufacturers.5 9 If the purpose of the rule is to encourage consumer vigilance, the state should be interested in
preventing its consumers from recovering from any manufacturer."
The problem of ascertaining a state's policy is multiplied by the
number of territorial connections in a particular product liability
case. A typical suit has numerous territorial connections; thus a
number of interested states will be affected by the disposition of the
case. States having an interest in the suit include the place of injury,
place of manufacture, place of sale, place of the plaintiff's domicile,
and place of the defendant's domicile. Furthermore, the defective
product could be assembled from parts produced in many other
states. All of the above-mentioned states may have a legitimate interest in the outcome of the case."1
A sampling of product liability choice of law cases demonstrates
the divergent state interests courts attribute to product liability
rules.62 In ascertaining the policy underlying pro-recovery rules,
some courts have held that the purpose is to ensure a defect-free
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 649-51, 475 A.2d at 651-52.
Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124, 1129 (lst Cir. 1978).
See, e.g., Armstrong Cork Co. v. Drott Mfg. Co., 433 F. Supp. 413, 416 (E.D. Pa.

1977) (Georgia policy "limits the potential scope of a manufacturer's liability, thus encouraging manufacturing and fabrication of products in Georgia.").

58. See D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 1933-1983, at 297 (1985).
59.

For an analogous argument regarding a state's desire to protect its consumers, see

supra note 55 and accompanying text.
60. If the interest of the state is to encourage consumer vigilance, the focus of state
interest is solely on the purchaser. It should not make a difference where the product was

manufactured.
61.

The number of contacts may be further multiplied, since it is very common for prod-

uct liability suits to be brought as class action suits. See, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Product
Liability Litigation, 580 F. Supp. 690 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). In a given class action suit there are

plaintiffs from many states. A court that applies interest analysis would have to ascertain the
interests of all these states.

62. The cases analyzed below do not apply Currie's interest analysis specifically. To the
extent that they seek to ascertain the relevant interests of the states involved in each case,
however, their approach is the same as Currie's.
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product, while other courts have suggested that the purpose is to ensure full compensation to the injured party. In Roy v. Star Chopper
Co.,0 3 a Massachusetts plaintiff sued a Rhode Island corporation in
Rhode Island for personal injuries caused by the defendant's defective product. Rhode Island had a strict liability rule.'" Massachusetts
had not yet clearly adopted strict liability.65 The Rhode Island court
held that Rhode Island had an interest in applying its strict liability
rule for the benefit of any plaintiff. The court reasoned that "Rhode
Island has an interest in promoting a high standard of care in the
manufacture of goods by Rhode Island corporations."' Thus, Rhode
Island's interest would be furthered by allowing recovery even to an
out-of-state plaintiff.
In Armstrong Cork Co. v. Drott Manufacturing Co.,6 7 a Pennsylvania corporation sued a Wisconsin manufacturer in Pennsylvania
on the theory of strict liability for the destruction of a logging machine in Georgia. Georgia's product liability laws limited recovery
based on strict liability to natural persons.66 Wisconsin law allowed
recovery based on strict liability for purchaser corporations. 69 The
plaintiff argued that since Wisconsin is the place of manufacture, its
pro-recovery rules should apply. The court stated that Wisconsin law
was not applicable because the purpose of the Wisconsin pro-recovery law was only to protect Wisconsin consumers. Wisconsin, the
court held, does not have an interest in protecting out-of-state
70
consumers.
By simply assigning different policies to the pro-recovery rules
of their respective states without explanation, the courts in Roy and
Armstrong Cork reached different results. In Roy, the court held
that Rhode Island's interest in promoting a higher standard of care
for manufacturers would be furthered by applying its law even to the
benefit of an out-of-state plaintiff.71 Alternatively, the court in Armstrong Cork found that the purpose behind Wisconsin's pro-recovery
rule was to compensate Wisconsin consumers, not to benefit an out63.

584 F.2d 1124 (Ist Cir. 1978).

64. Id. at 1129.
65. Id.
66.

Id.

67. 433 F. Supp. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
68. Id. at 416.
69. Id. at 415.
70. Id. at 417 ("[N]o Wisconsin purchaser-consumer, for whom the strict liability rule
was fashioned to protect, has suffered damage in this case.").
71. Roy, 584 F.2d at 1129.
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of-state plaintiff.7 2 Thus, out-of-state plaintiffs were treated differently depending on the court's policy determination.
Some courts use interest analysis as a guise to reach a desired
result. For example, in Morgan v. Biro ManufacturingCo., 3 a Kentucky resident sued an Ohio manufacturer in Ohio for injuries sustained in Kentucky. The injuries were caused by the manufacturer's
defective grinder. The machine was twenty years old; its protective
guard had been removed years before the incident and was never
replaced.74 Kentucky law established a presumption that a product is
not defective if the injury occurred more than eight years after the
product's date of manufacture.7 5 Kentucky law further provided that
a manufacturer should be liable only for the personal injury that
would have occurred if the product had been used in its original,
unaltered condition. 6 Ohio law did not establish this presumption,
nor would Ohio law limit the recovery of the plaintiff.
The Morgan court held Kentucky law applicable. 7 7 In its analysis, the court acknowledged that Ohio has an interest in deterring
manufacturers from producing defective products .7 It would seem
that if deterrence is the underlying policy of Ohio's pro-recovery
rule, then Ohio should have an interest in applying its law to any
plaintiff, regardless of residence.7 Nevertheless, the court did not
apply Ohio law. According to the court, "the mere fact that twentyfive years ago appellee manufactured a commercial meat grinder in
Ohio and subsequently sold it to a Tennessee corporation with a protective guard in place which, in turn, was removed and a Kentucky
resident was injured thereby, does not justify an application of Ohio
law.", 0
If Ohio has a policy to deter manufacturers from producing defective goods, then that policy would be furthered by allowing recov72. Armstrong Cork, 433 F. Supp. at 417. Although the court points out that this case
involved only economic injury, this factor should not be determinative when deciding whether
the interest of the state is to protect consumers or to penalize manufacturers.
73. 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 474 N.E.2d 286 (1984).
74. Id. at 339, 474 N.E.2d at 287.
75. Id. at 343, 474 N.E.2d at 290 (citing Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(l) (BobbsMerrill Supp. 1986)).
76. Id. at 343-44, 474 N.E.2d at 290 (citing Ky.REV.STAT. ANN. § 411.320(1) (BobbsMerrill Supp. 1986)).
77. Id. at 343, 474 N.E.2d at 289-90.
78. Id. at 343, 474 N.E.2d at 289.
79. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), and text accompany-

ing note 56.
80. Morgan v. Biro Mfg. Co., 15 Ohio St. 3d 339, 343, 474 N.E.2d 286, 289.
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ery to a plaintiff from any state for an accident that occurred in any
jurisdiction, provided that the product was produced in Ohio.,, It
seems that the main factor the court considered in concluding that
Ohio does not have an interest in applying its law was that that the
defective product had been manufactured twenty-five years ago.
Seemingly, the court was expressing its dissatisfaction with Ohio
law, which allows a plaintiff to recover in full even twenty-five years
after the manufacture of the goods. Had this been a purely domestic
case, the court would have no choice but to follow the dictates of the
state legislature. Yet in this interstate case, the court was able to
disregard the law that it disfavored under the guise of interest
analysis.82
The difficulty in ascertaining with certainty the policies underlying a particular state's law leads to another problem with Currie's
approach to conflict of law issues. When there is a "true conflict"8' 3
between the policies of interested states, Currie's interest analysis
provides that "the sensible and clearly constitutional thing for any
court to do" is to apply forum law. 8
81. See Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 584 F.2d 1124 (lst Cir. 1978), and text accompanying note 56.
82. Morgan, at 339, 474 N.E.2d at 286. Perhaps the court felt it would not be furthering the deterrence policy by making a manufacturer pay for activities done 25 years before,
since the manufacturer may have already discontinued the activity after such a long period of
time. Even so, liability would encourage the manufacturer to take safety measures at the time
of manufacture to ensure that the product will not injure anyone in the future. If a manufacturer knows that it can expect liability anytime its products injure anyone, the manufacturer
will produce a safer product. For deterrence purposes, it should be irrelevant that the injury
occured 25 years after the manufacture of the product.
83. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
84, B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 119. In Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 9 (1963), the author suggests that a true conflict can be solved
through a process called comparative impairment. The "[n]ormative resolution of real conflicts
cases is possible where one of the assertedly applicable rules is more pertinent to the case than
the competing rule." Id. at 9. Yet before courts can determine the scope of a rule, they must
determine with certainty the purpose of the rule. In product liability suits, this task is extremely difficult. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
California's experience with comparative impairment demonstrates the weakness of the
approach. In Hurtado v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 574, 522 P.2d 666, 114 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1974), the California Supreme Court adopted the comparative impairment approach. In a
later decision, Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co., 22 Cal. 3d 157, 583 P.2d 721, 148
Cal. Rptr. 867 (1978), the court said that comparative impairment should be used to resolve
the true conflict. The court, however, went on to inquire whether the relevant laws were
"archaic," or "no longer of pressing importance." Id. at 166, 583 P.2d at 726-27, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 872-73. This is hardly a comparative impairment analysis. It seems that the court
realized that a "comparative impairment" analysis was not possible, and it settled for the
"better rule" approach.
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In product liability cases, where it is extremely difficult to deter-

mine the interests behind the substantive rules with certainty, applying forum law is not the only "sensible and constitutional" 85 course
of action. When the forum has a clear interest, there is no reason for
it to sacrifice its interest to further a foreign state's interest. When
the forum state's interest is less certain, however, the court should
consider the foreign interest, rather then simply applying forum
law. 86
B.

The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws' "Most
Significant Relationship" Approach

Section 145 of the Restatement (Second) states the general

principle that the "rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to
an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which,
with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the
occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6.
Sec-

tion 6 lists seven factors relevant to the choice of applicable law. 88
85. B. CURRIE, supra note 19, at 119.
86. Moreover, if Currie's approach that forum law prevails in any true conflict is applied
to product liability cases, courts can almost always find a forum policy which will be furthered
by applying forum law. This would result in forum law always being applied in product liability conflict of law suits. See D. CAVERS, supra note 58, at 300-03.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). Section 145 reads in full:
The General Principle
(i) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most
significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated
in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
Id.
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). Section 6 reads in full:
Choice-of-Law Principles
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of
its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
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These factors include the policies of the forum, the policies underlying the particular field of law, and the policies of other interested
states. Subsection 2 of section 145 lists a series of contacts to be
taken into account when applying the principles of section 6. Contacts that should be considered include place of injury, place of injury-causing conduct, the domicile, residence, nationality, and place
of incorporation of the parties, and the center of any relationship
between the parties.89
The major problem with the Restatement (Second) approach is
its failure to provide the court with guidance when the contacts and
various factors of section 6 lead in different directions. 90 This problem is especially acute in product liability cases where a diversity of
potential contacts and policies exist. For example, a state X citizen is
hurt in state Y by a product manufactured in state Z. Both state X
and state Z have a pro-plaintiff rule. State Y has a pro-manufacturer rule. Section 145 does not provide any guidance in determining
whose law should apply. Comments (c) and (e) of section 14591 suggest that a court should look into the purposes of the various laws
and apply the law of the state whose policies will be affected by the
outcome of the case. This raises the same difficulties in determining
the state's purpose encountered by application of Currie's interest
analysis.92 In addition, if state policies clash, the Restatement (Second) approach does not provide a basis for courts to decide which
state's law should prevail.
Section 146 of the Restatement (Second) provides a presumption that the local law of the state of injury determines the rights
and liabilities of the parties, unless some other state stands in a more
significant relationship to the occurrence and to the parties.93 Thus,
those states in determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.

Id.
89. See supra note 87.
90. In Juenger, Choice of Law in Interstate Torts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 202, 213 (1969),
the author writes that the Restatement (Second) formula is "the most poignant admission of
unrestatability." In R. CRAMPTON, D. CURRIE, & H. KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 307 (2d ed.
1975) the authors refer to the Restatement (Second) approach as being a "flabby, amorphous

and sterile product."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 comments c & e (1971).
92. See text accompanying notes 45-82.
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971). Section 146 reads in full:
Personal Injuries

91.
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when contacts and policies lead in divergent directions, and the court
cannot determine which state has the most significant relationship to
the occurrence and the parties, the law of the place of injury would
apply.

94

The law of the state of injury is applied because it is presumed
that the state of injury has the most significant relationship with the

issue. Such a presumption is justified in tort cases, when the place of
injury and the place of the defendant's conduct are the same. The
state where the defendant's conduct occurred has a strong interest in
deterring behavior that causes injuries within its territory. In a typical product liability case, however, the place of injury and the place
of manufacture are two different states, and there is no basis for
presuming that the place of injury has the most significant
95

relationship.
Many courts have struggled in their attempt to use the Restatement (Second) approach in product liability cases.9 6 For example, in
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury occurred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local law of
the other state will be applied.
Id.

94.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 146 (1971).
95. Apparently, this presumption stems from the discredited vested rights rules and is
therefore subject to many of the same criticisms. See supra note 20.
96. Many courts claiming to apply the Restatement (Second) approach apply § 145
without reference to the policies in § 6. See, e.g., Bruce v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 837 (W.D. Okla. 1975), affid, 544 F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1976); Adams v. Buffalo Forge
Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me. 1982). These courts decided the choice of law question before they
identified the relevant laws. Thus, they did not properly apply the Restatement (Second) approach. Applying § 145 without reference to § 6 creates a jurisdiction-selecting approach and
is therefore subject to many of the same criticisms as the vested rights rule. See supra notes
21-23 and accompanying text. This problem can be traced to the original draft of § 145 of the
Restatement (Second) which did not include a reference to § 6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1964). This original draft was subject to much
criticism. See, e.g., Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, A Recent Development in Conflict of
Laws, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1212, 1235 (1963) ("The question whether a particular 'contact' is
significant is meaningless unless significance is judged in terms of the policies and interests of
the states involved."). In the newer drafts, it is made clear that a court must evaluate § 145
contacts with reference to § 6 policies. Under § 6, a court must evaluate the relevant laws
before deciding the choice of law question. See supra note 88 for the text of § 6.
Additionally, some courts misconstrued § 6 of the Restatement (Second). For example, in
Baird v. Bell Helicopter Textron, 491 F. Supp. 1129 (N.D. Tex. 1980), a British Columbia
resident sued Bell Helicopter, a Texas corporation, in Texas on a theory of strict liability.
Texas recognized a strict liability cause of action, while British Columbia did not. Id. at 114041. Applying § 6, subsection (2)(g), supra note 88, the court found that "ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied" would be furthered by applying Texas law.
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In re Air Crash Disaster at Washington, D.C., 97 the plaintiff sued
the Boeing Corporation in the District of Columbia on a theory of
strict liability. The case arose from the crash of a passenger jet in
the District of Columbia. 98 The jet was designed and manufactured
by Boeing in the State of Washington.9" The plaintiff argued that
Boeing was strictly liable for damages caused by inadequate instructions in Boeing's 737 Operating Manual.100 The District of Columbia would apply a strict liability standard for such a claim, 10 1 while
Washington State would apply a negligence standard.102
The In re Air Crash court applied section 6 subsections (2)(b)
and (c)103 of the Restatement (Second), which suggest that in deciding which state's law to apply, a court should consider the policies of
the forum and the policies of other interested states. The court found
that Washington State had an interest in applying its law to protect
Boeing, a Washington manufacturer.10 4 The District of Columbia
also had an interest in applying its anti-manufacturer rule in order
to promote air safety at its airports.105 The court concluded that "the
interest of Washington State

. .

.is not as great as the interest of

the District of Columbia, and as the District of Columbia has the
most significant relationship to this issue, its law shall control." 106
In In re Air Crash, the Restatement (Second) properly directed
the court to inquire into which state had an interest in having its law
apply.10 7 Once the court decided that both states had interests at
stake and that these interests conflicted, however, the Restatement
491 F. Supp. at 1141. The court reasoned that a Texas court, being familiar with Texas law,

would naturally find Texas law easier to apply. Id.
The Baird courts' reasoning, however, would always lead to a preference for forum law
even though the drafters of the Restatement (Second) specifically excluded preference for forum law from the list of policy considerations of § 6. See Morris, Law and Reason Triumphant or How Not to Review a Restatement, 21 AM. J.CoMP. LAW 322, 323 (1973). The
proper interpretation of section (2)(g) is that choice of law rules should be "simple [to understand] and easy to apply." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6, comment j

(1971).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

559 F. Supp. 333 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
Id. at 339.
Id. at 343 n.12.
Id. at 345.
Id.
Id. at 345-47.

103. Id. at 341-44. See supra note 88 for the full text of these sections.
104. In re Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. at 351.
105. Id. at 350.
106.

Id. at 351.

107. Id. at 351-52.
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(Second) did not give the court any guidance in determining which
state's law to apply. The court simply decided that the pro-plaintiff
interests of the District of Columbia are greater than the pro-manufacturer interests of Washington State.108 Advocates of strong product safety laws will argue that the court's ruling was just, while advocates of pro-manufacturer laws have good reason to argue that the
decision in this case was unfair.
Professor Reese, a reporter of the Restatement (Second), recognized the limitations of his work. 0 9 He defended the Restatement

(Second) by saying that it was formulated only as a general approach, one which courts could use to develop specific rules for
resolving conflict of law issues. 110 Although the Restatement (Second) is over fifteen years old, courts still have not developed a comprehensive set of rules."'
108. Id. The court discussed the Preamble of the Washington Products Liability Act of
1981, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010 (Supp. 1986), which clearly stated that Washington
is interested in protecting its manufacturers, but the court concluded that "the statements in
the preamble to the Washington act have more to do with the denial of punitive damages than
with the rule on the standard for products liability." In re Air Crash, 559 F. Supp. at 351.
Yet even without the "Preamble," it is very clear that Washington has an interest in
establishing high standards of proof to protect its manufacturers.
109. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 315, 325 (1972).
110. Id. at 325.
111. The New York Court of Appeals is the only court to have developed a set of rules.
Though derived in the context of traditional tort issues, these rules are equally applicable in
product liability litigation. In Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31 N.Y.2d 121, 128, 286 N.E.2d 454,
457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 70 (1972), a case dealing with New York's guest statute, the court
set forth three rules:
1. When the guest-passenger and the host-driver are domiciled in the same state,
and the car is there registered, the law of that state should control and determine
the standard of care which the host owes to his guest.
2. When the driver's conduct occurred in the state of his domicile and that state
does not cast him in liability for that conduct, he should not be held liable by reason
of the fact that liability would be imposed upon him under the tort law of the state
of the victim's domicile. Conversely, when the guest was injured in the state of his
own domicile and its law permits recovery, the driver who has come into that state
should not-in the absence of special circumstances-be permitted to interpose the
law of his state as a defense.
3. In other situations, when the passenger and the driver are domiciled in different
states, the rule is necessarily less categorical. Normally, the applicable rule of decision will be that of the state where the accident occurred but not if it can be shown
that displacing that normally applicable rule will advance the relevant substantive
law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or
producing great uncertainty for litigants.
Id. at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 457-58, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
In a recent decision, Schultz v. Boy Scouts of America, 65 N.Y.2d 189, 480 N.E.2d 679,
491 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1985), however, the court displayed a lack of commitment to implementing
these rules. In Schultz, the parents of sexually abused children sued two charitable organiza-
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Pro-PlaintiffRules

Some scholars suggest that when a choice of law question arises
tions (Boy Scouts and the Franciscan Brothers) for damages on a theory of negligent hiring
and supervision. The plaintiffs' children, New Jersey residents, were members of the New
Jersey branch of the Boy Scouts of America. The Franciscan Brothers supplied scoutmasters
to the Boy Scouts.
Edmund Coakeley was one of the scoutmasters supplied by the Franciscan Brothers.
While on a scout trip to New York, Coakeley sexually molested the children. One of the
children later committed suicide in New Jersey. The plaintiffs' parents claimed that the sexual
attack caused their children severe psychological problems, and as a result, one of their children committed suicide. They charged that the defendants were negligent in assigning
Coakeley to a position in which he could sexually molest children.
The Franciscan Brothers were incorporated in Ohio. New Jersey had a charitable immunity statute. Ohio recognized a similar doctrine subject to the exception of negligent hiring and
supervision. New York had abolished charitable immunity.
The court applied New Jersey law in the suit against the Fransiscan Brothers. Id. at 20102, 480 N.E.2d at 687, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 98. The court recognized that the third Neumeler
rule was applicable because the parties were domiciled in different jurisdictions and the tort
occurred in a third jurisdiction. Under the third rule, the law of the place of tort will normally
apply unless displacing it "will advance the relevant substantive law purposes without impairing the smooth working of the multi-state system or producing great uncertainty for litigants."
Neumneler, 31 N.Y.2d at 128, 286 N.E.2d at 458, 335 N.Y.S.2d at 70.
The court found that applying New Jersey law "will enhance the smooth working of the
multi-state system by actually reducing the incentive for forum shopping and it will provide
certainty for the litigants.
... Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 201, 480 N.E.2d at 687, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 98. The court reasoned that New Jersey has an interest in promoting the continuation of defendant's charitable activities in the state. Id. at 200, 480 N.E.2d at 687, 491
N.Y.S.2d at 97. New Jersey's interest will be furthered by applying its charitable immunity
statute to the defendant. Furthermore, New Jersey has an interest in subjecting its domiciliaries to accept the burdens as well as the benefits of its tort law. Id. New York, the court held,
has no significant interest in applying its own law to this dispute. Id.
If the New York court is committed to applying a rule system, the exception to rule three
should not apply unless it is very clear that the application of the law of a state other than the
place of injury will advance the relevant substantive law policies of that state. If the court does
not require a high standard, then rule three becomes meaningless, for the court can always
circumvent the rule by applying interest analysis. This will hardly further "predictability and
uniformity," which is New York's reason for adopting a rule system. Neumeier v. Kuehner, 31
N.Y.2d 121, 127-28, 286 N.E.2d 454, 457, 335 N.Y.S.2d 64, 69 (1972).
The dissent in the Schultz case argued that New York has a strong interest in having its
law apply. A state has a strong interest in preventing injurious conduct from occurring within
its borders regardless of the residency of the victims. Schultz, 65 N.Y.2d at 207-08, 480
N.E.2d at 691, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 102 (Jasen J., dissenting). New York abolished its charitable
immunity statute in order to deter injurious activity. Although the majority opinion asserts
that "the rule in conflict is loss-allocating rather than conduct-regulating," id. at 200, 480
N.E,2d at 686, 491 N.Y.S.2d at 97-98, in Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143 N.E.2d 3, 163
N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957), the case in which New York abolished its charitable immunity statute, the
court made it clear that it was doing so to give "warning that justice and the law demand the
exercise of care." Id. at 666, 143 N.E.2d at 8, 163 N.Y.S.2d at 11.
New York's interest in preventing the occurrence of misconduct within its borders clashes
with New Jersey's policy of protecting charitable institutions. Both states have a strong interest in having their law apply. The application of the law of either state "will advance the

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol15/iss1/6

18

Rosenfeld: Conflicts of Law in Product Liability Suits: Joint Maximization o

19861

JOINT MAXIMIZATION

in a product liability suit, the court should apply the pro-plaintiff
rule. 112 Proponents of this view argue that a choice of law rule
should further the policies underlying the substantive rules. According to these proponents, the underlying policy of product liability law
is to obligate the manufacturer to compensate consumers injured by
defective products. This policy is apparent in the past judicial trend
in product3 liability suits favoring the extension of manufacturer's
11
liability.
The thesis of the pro-plaintiff approach does not comport with
the present state of product liability law. 11 4 When the courts first
shifted from negligence to strict liability, the policy underlying prod-

uct liability rules was pro-plaintiff. Today, however, courts handling
product liability issues are more concerned with the limits to which
they will stretch strict liability. 115 Reacting to the concern generated
by costly product liability judgments, the underlying policy has
shifted from its pro-plaintiff bias. 1 Courts and legislators have realized that rigidity in ruling for the plaintiff stifles productivity. 17 As
a result, many legislatures have already passed new product liability
rules designed to limit the liability of manufacturers. 1 8
relevant substantive law purposes." A court faithful to the Neumeier rules should apply the
law of the state of injury.
112. See, e.g., Kilhne, Choice of Law in Products Liability, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27-32
(1972); Reese, Products Liability and Choice of Law: The United States Proposals to the
Hague Conference, 25 VAND. L. REv. 29, 31-38 (1972).
In Cousins v. Instrument Flyers, 44 N.Y.2d 698, 700, 376 N.E.2d 914, 915, 405
N.Y.S.2d 441, 443 (1978), the court's assessment of the pro-plaintiff rule approach was that
"[s]uch a rule, although facile of application, appears incongruous."
113. See articles cited supra note 112.
114. See infra note 118.
115. See, e.g., Johnson, Products Liability "Reform". A Hazard to Consumers, 56 N.C.
L. REv. 677 (1978); Comment, State Legislative Restrictions on Product Liability Actions, 29
MERCER L. REv. 619 (1978).

116. See Draft Uniform Product Liability Law, 44 Fed. Reg. 2997 (1979). Section 101
Findings:
(a) Sharply rising product liability insurance premiums have created serious
problems in interstate commerce resulting in:

(1) Increased prices of consumer and industrial products;
(2) Disincentives to develop high-risk but potentially beneficial products;
(3) Businesses going without product liability insurance coverage, thus jeopardizing the availability of compensation to injured persons; and
(4) Panic "reform" efforts that would unreasonably curtail the rights of
product users.
Id.
117, Id.
118. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-01.(1) (Supp. 1985) ("product manufacturers are discouraged from continuing to provide and manufacture certain products because of
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Similarly, the underlying policy of Professor Cavers' "Principles
of Preference"""' approach is no longer valid. Professor Cavers' approach is based on the assumption that product liability policy is
necessarily pro-plaintiff.1 20 According to Cavers, all states share an
interest in protecting the consumer, and manufacturer protection is
only a secondary interest. Therefore, he argues, in choice of law
problems, courts should prefer pro-plaintiff rules. 21 The basic flaw
in Cavers' approach, and that of the other proponents of pro-plaintiff
rules, is that manufacturer protection can no longer be considered a
secondary concern. Today, an equal concern exists for both manufacturer and consumer protection,122 necessitating choice of law rules
that further both policies.
III.

JOINT MAXIMIZATION OF STATES' INTERESTS

A.

The Theory

In multi-state product liability suits, where it is extremely diffithe high cost and possible unavailability of products liability insurance"); WASH. REV. CODE.
ANN. § 7.72.010 preamble (Supp. 1986) ("Of particular concern is ...
product liability law.
Sharply rising premiums for . . . insurance . . . have resulted in disincentives to industrial
innovation and the development of new products.").
In a recent New York Times article, the author found that the present trend throughout
the country is to limit tort liability by legislative reform. "There are more than 1,000 bills out
there addressing the issue." Kristof, Insurance Woes Spur Many States to Amend Law on
Liability Suits, N.Y. Times, Mar. 31, 1986, at Al, col. 2.
119. D. CAVERS, supra note 58, at 315.
120. Id. at 310.
121. For a brief synopsis of Professor Cavers' conflict of law theory, see von Mehren,
Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 27, 37 (Spring
1977):
[P]rinciples of choice or preference are developed on the assumption that modern
societies share, for the general run of situations, certain values and are, accordingly,
prepared to subordinate others that may be preferred in the particular case by a
concerned state in order to advance, overall, both generally preferred values and the
ideal of uniform and disinterested solutions to conflicts problems.
Accordingly, in product liability conflict of law issues, where Professor Cavers' principles
of preference have a strong pro-plaintiff bias, supra text accompanying note 119, consumer
protection is society's primary concern. Manufacturer protection is only a secondary concern.
122. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010 preamble (Supp. 1986). "It is the
intent of the legislature to treat the consuming public, the product seller, [and] the product
manufacturer . . . in a balanced fashion." Id.
Other scholars have adopted conflict of law approaches for product liability suits which
are similar to Professor Cavers' approach. See Weintraub, A Defense of Interest Analysis in
the Conflict of Laws and the Use of that Analysis in Products Liability Cases, 46 OHIO ST.
L.J. 493, 508 (1985); Convention on the Law Applicable to Products Liability, Documents of
the 12th Session of the Hague Conference on Private International Law (1972), reprinted in
21 Am. J. CoMp. L. 150 (1973).
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cult to ascertain which single state is most interested in having its
law applied, courts inevitably maximize the interests of one state

while completely rejecting the interests of other states. Instead of
narrowly promoting the interests of a single state, courts should

adopt rules designed to further the interests of all concerned states.
This entails establishing substantive product liability laws 123 that will
124
identify and maximize those policies that the involved states share.
In establishing these rules, courts should consider all possible policies
attributable to each concerned state's relevant law. In a case with
more than two interested states, courts should develop a rule that
123. The principle of applying special substantive rules in conflict of law cases is not
In I JITTA, LA SUBSTANCE DES OBLIGATIONS DANS LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIv9 23
(1906), quoted in Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30
YALE L.J. 655, 669 (1921). The author suggests that when courts are faced with a conflict of
law they should apply "an independent provision which is derived from a consideration of the
local public order and the universal public order." This approach was criticized for its failure
to guide judges on how to establish such rules. Id.
124. In von Mehren, supra note 121, at 39-42, the author suggests that when a true
conflict exists, courts should develop special substantive rules to compromise the clashing policies. In von Mehren, Special Substantive Rules for Multistate Problems: Their Role and
Significance in Contemporary Choice of Law Methodology, 88 HARV. L. REV. 347, 366
(1974), the author gives an example: a dog owned by a resident of State A strays into State B,
where it bites a resident of State B. State A allows recovery, but State B does not. Plaintiff
would recover one-half of his actual damages under a rule compromising the differences of
both states.
This rule of splitting the loaf does not further the interests of the anti-recovery state in
any way. State B does not want recovery at all. If the plaintiff recovers fifty percent, the
interests of State B are not furthered. See Twerski & Mayer, Toward A PragmaticSolution
of Choice-of-Law Problems-atthe Interface of Substance and Procedure,74 Nw. U. L. REV.
781, 799 (1979). A substantive rule furthering policies of both states would, by definition,
further State B's interests.
Twerski and Mayer suggest that multistate rules might fully advance the policies of all
interested states at the same time. Id. at 783-84. Professor Sedler argues that it is impossible
to develop rules that fully satisfy the policies of all interested states in a particular case. Sedler, On Choice of Law and the Great Quest: A Critique of Special Multistate Solutions to
Choice-of-Law Problems, 7 HOFSTRA L. REV. 807 (1979). This Note does not attempt to establish rules that further all policies of the interested states, but rather, advocates the establishment of rules that further the policies of the interested states as much as possible.
Nor does this Note suggest that courts adopt a "substantive super law." In Kozyris, Interest Analysis Facing its Critics-And, Incidentally, What Should Be Done About Choice of
Law for Products Liability?, 46 OHIO ST. LJ. 569, 571 (1985), the author criticizes those who
suggest that courts adopt a "substantive super law." "[S]tates and nations have different perceptions on where to draw the line of justice. . . . The struggle then is not between good and
evil, but between at least two goods or two lesser evils. By what authority . . . can a judge
select one of these senses of justice over that which prevails in his own state?" Id. at 571.
This Note does not suggest that courts should develop the best substantive product liability law for application in product liability suits. Instead, this Note suggests that courts should
consider the interests of all concerned states, and develop a substantive rule which will further
all these interests to the greatest extent possible.
new.
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would maximize the joint interests of the polar views. Such a rule
should, by definition, further the interests of the views in the middle.
Rules furthering the joint interests of all concerned states are
possible in product liability cases because all states share a common
interest in protecting both manufacturers and consumers. 125 When a
state establishes a product liability rule favoring consumers, it subordinates its pro-manufacturer interest in favor of a pro-plaintiff interest. Similarly, a state with a pro-manufacturer rule subordinates its
pro-consumer interest. A rule maximizing the joint policies of proconsumer and pro-manufacturer laws would foster both policies to
the same extent.
In product liability cases, the adoption of rules that would maximize the joint interests of all concerned states would further most
major choice of law policies.126 These policies are set forth below.
1. The Needs of the Interstate System. - Choice of law rules
meet the needs of the interstate system when they are based on policies that "further harmonious relations between states."' 27 Good will
is enhanced when states consider the needs and policies of other
states.128 By giving equal weight to local and foreign policies, joint
maximization rules would further the needs of the interstate system.
2. The Relevant Policies of the Forum State and Other Interested States. - This policy directs a court to consider the relevant
policies of all concerned states and to apply the law of the state
whose interests will be most affected by the outcome of the case. 29
Such an approach presupposes that courts can determine with reasonable certainty which single state will be most affected by the determination of the case. In a product liability case, however, where it
is extremely difficult to determine this issue, courts should attempt to
further the policies of all potentially affected states.
3. The Basic Policies Underlying a Particular Field of Law. The two basic policies in product liability laws are protecting consumers from defective products and protecting manufacturers from
overly burdensome costs.130 Both of these policies are given equal
125. When the interests of two states are fundamentally opposed such rules are impossible; for example, rules can not be developed for two states with opposing views concerning
polygamy. See von Mehren, supra note 121, at 40.
126. These policies are listed in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6
comments d-k (1971).
127. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 comment d (1971).
128. Id. comment k (discussing the need for reciprocity between states).
129. Id. comment f.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 112-22.
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consideration by the joint maximization rules.
4. Ease in the Determination and Application of the Law to be
Applied. - This policy is furthered by applying choice of law rules
that are "simple and easy to apply." 131 Initially, courts may have

difficulty establishing these rules. There are, however, a limited number of issues in the product liability field, and once courts establish
precedent the rules will be easy to apply.
5. Predictability and Uniformity of Result.

-

Because both

product liability laws and choice of law rules vary from state to
state, different forums produce different results.132 Joint maximization rules would encourage uniform results among those states that

adopt the theory. This choice of law rule would only be adopted by
states truly interested in furthering the policies of all concerned

states. If states did formulate different rules, the rule most successful
in advancing the goals of joint maximization should ultimately be

adopted by all states.
B.

Application of the Theory

1. Example I-Subsequent Repair Rule. -

Courts are split

over whether evidence of subsequent repair should be admitted in

strict liability suits. 133 This issue arises when the manufacturer takes
measures after an accident occurs which, if taken earlier, would have

prevented the accident.
1 34
The policies for not admitting evidence of subsequent repair
include a desire to encourage manufacturers to repair defective products. If the subsequent repair can be used as evidence against manu-

facturers, they will refrain from repairing defective products. 35 Furthermore, subsequent repair evidence is highly prejudicial. Jurors
131.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS

§ 6 comment j (1971).

132. For a discussion of how different forums can produce different results, see supra
notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
133. State court decisions admitting subsequent repair evidence to prove strict liability
include: Ault v. International Harvester, 13 Cal. 3d 113, 528 P.2d 1148, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812
(1975); Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc., 196 Conn. 134, 491 A.2d 389 (1985); Chart
v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis. 2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977).
State court decisions that have not admitted subsequent repair evidence to prove strict
liability include: Price v. Buckingham Mfg. Co., 110 N.J. Super. 462, 266 A.2d 140 (1970);
Haysom v. Coleman Lantern Co., 89 Wash. 2d 474, 573 P.2d 785 (1978).
Similarly, there is a split in the federal circuit courts on this issue. Compare Smyth v.
Upjohn Co., 529 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1975) (refusing introduction of subsequent repair evidence), with Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1977)
(admitting subsequent repair evidence).
134. See FED. R. EvID. 407.
135. E.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857 (4th Cir. 1980).
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may construe subsequent repair evidence as an admission of fault or
product defect. 136
Some policies favor the admission of subsequent repair evidence.
Without subsequent repair evidence, it would be extremely difficult
for the plaintiff to prove his prima facie case. 37 Even with strict
liability, the plaintiff must prove that the product was defective. In a
design defect suit, this entails providing the court with an alternative
design that would have avoided the injury.138 Thus, the consumer
plaintiff would have to hire experts to study the product and produce
an alternative design. The costs of this process could preclude plaintiffs from pursuing their claims.1 39
Additionally, strict liability often represents a policy decision
that the manufacturer should bear the burden of injuries brought
about by a defective product. Admitting subsequent repair evidence
1 40
would further that policy.
Finally, admitting subsequent repair evidence in strict product
liability cases will not deter manufacturers from repairing defective
products. 14 ' A typical mass-producer manufactures a large number
of similar goods; if the manufacturer fails to remedy the defect in its
products, it could face potentially harmful publicity and possibly
debilitating law suits. A manufacturer would be working against its
1 42
economic interest by not repairing a known defect.
A rule maximizing the joint interests of all states would admit
the evidence of subsequent repair or redesign for the limited purpose
of proving the feasibility of an alternative. 14 This rule would not
admit evidence of the subsequent repair for the purpose of proving
136. E.g., Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Chapman, 180 Ind. App. 33, 65, 388 N.E.2d
541, 561 (1979).
137. See Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 55 N.Y.2d 571, 579-80, 436 N.E.2d 182, 185, 450
N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (1982) ("Products liability law cannot be expected to stand still where
innocent victims face 'inordinately difficult problems of proof' ") (quoting Caprara v. Chrysler
Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 4117 N.E.2d 545, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251 (1981)).
138. See, e.g., Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741, 744 (7th Cir. 1974).
139. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g. Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237, (1978) ("[O]ne of the principle purposes behind the strict product liability doctrine is to relieve an injured plaintiff of the onerous evidentiary burdens.").
140. See, e.g., Sanderson v. Steve Snyder Enters., Inc.., 196 Conn. 134, 145-46, 491
A.2d 389, 395 (1985).
141. See, e.g., Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal. 3d 113, 120, 528 P.2d 1148,
1152, 117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 816 (1975).
142. Id.
143. See Twerski, Post-Accident Design Modification Evidence in a ManufacturingDefect Setting: Strict Liability and Beyond, 4 J.PROD. LIAB. 143, 160-61 (1981).
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that this particular manufacturer repaired its product."", The manufacturer would be given the choice of either admitting that an alternative is feasible, or allowing the court to admit evidence that the
manufacturer repaired the product. Manufacturer policies are furthered by not admitting evidence that the manufacturer subsequently repaired its product, thus eliminating the most prejudicial
aspect of subsequent repair evidence.'4 5 Pro-plaintiff policies are furthered by admitting the subsequent repair evidence to prove the feasibility of an alternative design, which greatly reduces the plaintiff's
burden of proving his prima facie case.
2. Example II-Failure to Warn: State of the Art Defense. Courts are split on the issue of whether a state of the art defense
should be allowed in cases involving a failure to warn. This issue
arises when a manufacturer does not warn of a risk scientifically unknowable at the time of distribution, but known at the time of trial.
Some courts hold that under these circumstances the manufacturer
is liable for all injuries caused by its failure to warn. 46 The majority
47
of courts disagree.1
A number of policies favor the imposition of liability on the
manufacturer. One basis for imposing liability is the belief that as
between innocent victims and producers of dangerous products, fairness dictates that the producers "should bear the unforeseen costs of
1 48
the product."'
Other policies suggest that if courts impose liability on manufacturers based upon knowledge available at the time of trial, manufacturers will invest more in safety research to make sure that all
possible dangers are eliminated. 49
Furthermore, courts will have great difficulty ascertaining
whether or not the risk was scientifically knowable at the time of
distribution. Plaintiff's efforts to gather evidence could be easily frustrated where the evidence is under the exclusive control of the manu144. Id.
145. See Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 136, 417 N.E.2d 545, 557, 436
N.Y.S.2d 251, 262-63 (1981) (Jasen, J., dissenting).
146. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982);
Hayes v. Ariens Co., 391 Mass. 407, 462 N.E.2d 273 (1984) (citing and approving Beshada);
Little v. PPG Indus., 19 Wash. App. 812, 819-22, 579 P.2d 940, 945-47 (1978), aff'd as
modified, 92 Wash. 2d 118, 594 P.2d 911 (1979).
147. E.g., Payne v. Soft Sheen Prod., 486 A.2d 712, 721 n.8 (D.C. 1985); Woodill v.
Parke Davis & Co., 79 111.2d 26, 402 N.E.2d 194 (1980).
148. Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prod. Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 209, 447 A.2d 539, 549
(1982).
149. Id. at 206-07, 447 A.2d at 547-48.
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facturer. Finally, the cost involved in determining this issue would be
astronomical. Courts should avoid legal rules that would greatly add
to the cost both sides incur in litigating a case. 150
Policies also exist that reject manufacturer's liability. If courts
impose liability on manufacturers for scientifically unknowable risks,
manufacturers will be very hesitant in placing new necessary products on the market."" Moreover, it is unfair to subject the manufacturer to a standard scientifically unknowable at the time of
1 52
production.
A rule maximizing the joint interests of all states would allow
the plaintiff to establish his prima facie case by proving that the risk
is known at the time of trial. Knowledge of the risk at the time of
trial would create a presumption that the risk was scientifically
knowable at the time of production. The manufacturer could rebut
the presumption by proving that the risk was not scientifically knowable at the time of production.1 53
This rule furthers the pro-manufacturer policies by allowing
manufacturers to free themselves from liability by proving that the
risk was scientifically unknowable at the time of production. Similarly, this rule furthers pro-plaintiff policies; by establishing a presumption that if a risk is known at the time of trial, the risk was
known at the time of production, the plaintiff's task in proving his
prima facie case is significantly reduced. Furthermore, the burden of
proving that the risk was unknowable belongs to the manufacturer,
who has better access to the evidence than does the plaintiff. Thus,
this presumption significantly enhances the chances of the plaintiff to
recover from the manufacturer.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The existing choice of law approaches all fail when trying to
meet the special needs of product liability suits. Currie's analysis assumes that courts can identify state interests, an extremely complicated endeavor in a product liability case with several states involved. 54 Moreover, Currie's approach results in the application of
ISO. Id. at 207-08, 447 A.2d at 548.
151. Feldman v. Lederle Labs., [1983-84 Transfer Binder] PROD. LIAB. REP. (CCH)
9631 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1983).
152. Cf. Twerski & Weinstein, A Critique of the Uniform Product Liability Law-A
Rush to Judgment, 28 DRAKE L. REv. 221, 228 (1979).
153. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 453-54, 479 A.2d 374, 387-88 (1984);
Twerski & Weinstein, supra note 152, at 228.
154. See supra notes 53-72 and accompanying text.
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forum law when the forum has an interest at stake. In product liability suits, this is unsatisfactory since the courts can invariably find
some local interest that will be affected,
thus effectively ignoring the
1 55
legitimate interests of other states.
The Restatement (Second) is inadequate in providing guidance
in dealing with the many variables of product liability cases. 156 Nor
does the place of injury presumption of the Restatement (Second)
withstand logical scrutiny. 157 Finally, the pro-plaintiff advocates, including Professor Cavers, are out of touch with the modern concern
of protecting the interests of both manufacturers and consumers.1 58
All of these approaches contain a common denominator: each
approach solves choice of law problems by choosing one state's law
over another. This produces an inequitable result. A joint maximization approach that seeks to further the interests of all concerned
states would produce rational and fair results. As the examples indicate,1 59 it is possible to consider the interests of many states and produce a substantive rule beneficial to all.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals once described conflicts of
law suits as "the wilderness in which courts sometimes find themselves." 110 Joint maximization of state interests may well be the path
out of the wilderness.
Shimon A. Rosenfeld

155.
156.
157.

See supra note 86.
See supra notes 87-111 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying notes 93-94.

158.

See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.

159.

See supra text accompanying notes 133-53.

160.

Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d 608, 609 (9th Cir. 1975).
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